Dan Driscoll resigns as Army secretary after 18 months in the post, adding another major leadership change at the Pentagon as the United States manages active military operations abroad and an increasingly urgent effort to modernize the Army. The White House praised Driscoll’s record, while reporting from Reuters and The Associated Press points to months of tension between Driscoll and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth over senior personnel, readiness and the direction of Army transformation.
The White House did not give an official reason for Driscoll’s departure. An Army official told AP that Driscoll spoke with President Donald Trump about the state of the service and submitted his resignation, while Reuters cited a source who said disagreements over modernization and Hegseth’s personnel decisions had become a significant source of friction. The White House confirmed Driscoll is stepping down after 18 months.
Those reported disagreements should be distinguished from the administration’s official position. White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly credited Driscoll with improving readiness and lethality, supporting major military operations and assisting negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.
Dan Driscoll resigns during a period of Army upheaval
Driscoll entered office in February 2025 after Senate confirmation and became the 26th secretary of the Army. The civilian post carries responsibility for organizing, training, equipping and managing a force of nearly one million active-duty, Guard and Reserve soldiers as well as more than 265,000 civilian employees. The Army says the secretary oversees modernization and resources for nearly one million soldiers.
He brought an unusual combination of military, legal and private-sector experience. Driscoll served as an armor officer with the 10th Mountain Division, deployed to Iraq, later attended Yale Law School and worked in investment banking, private equity and business operations before joining the administration.
His tenure coincided with an aggressive push to change how the Army buys weapons. Driscoll publicly argued that modern warfare is being transformed by artificial intelligence, robotics, drones, advanced sensors, computing and rapidly improving commercial technology, creating pressure on the military to move faster than traditional procurement cycles allow. Driscoll argued that emerging technology is changing warfare at extraordinary speed.
That emphasis frequently placed cheaper drones, software and rapidly deployable systems alongside the Army’s traditional multibillion-dollar weapons programs. Driscoll also criticized large defense contractors and argued the service needed greater flexibility in purchasing equipment.
Those debates have become more consequential during simultaneous demands on the force. American News Brief recently examined the reported shortage of Patriot interceptors as U.S. and allied demand rises across multiple theaters, a reminder that modernization is not an abstract Pentagon exercise. It directly affects whether the military can replenish expensive weapons at the speed wartime operations consume them.
Tensions with Hegseth centered on leadership and transformation
The most sensitive portion of Driscoll’s departure concerns his relationship with Hegseth. Reuters reported that a source familiar with the matter said Driscoll raised concerns about Army transformation and readiness and believed Hegseth was blocking parts of that agenda by removing senior generals associated with the effort. A Reuters source linked the tension to Army transformation and readiness concerns.
One major rupture followed Hegseth’s April removal of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George. Reuters reported that the decision caught Driscoll off guard and intensified his frustration with the defense secretary.
Driscoll later told lawmakers that he and his family went to George’s home after his departure and gave him a hug, while also acknowledging the constitutional reality that civilian leaders have broad authority to select senior military leadership.
Gen. Christopher Donahue, commander of U.S. Army Europe and Africa, also left his position unexpectedly during the summer. AP described Donahue as one of nearly two dozen senior military leaders who had retired or departed early amid Hegseth’s effort to reduce the number of senior officers. Donahue stepped down after only about 18 months leading Army forces in Europe and Africa.
The turnover does not by itself establish that the Army is incapable of carrying out its missions. Civilian leaders are entitled to replace commanders whose priorities they do not share, and military organizations routinely undergo personnel changes when administrations change policy.
The legitimate question is whether the pace and pattern of those changes are improving command accountability or disrupting reforms at a moment when the service is under intense operational pressure. That can only be judged through readiness, procurement speed and battlefield performance rather than through personality disputes alone.
Drone policy illustrates the larger modernization argument
The disagreement over drones offers a concrete example of the competing approaches. AP reported that the Army has been rolling back a drone modernization effort Driscoll championed, including directing a Europe-based unit that had been developing its own unmanned aircraft to return to a more conventional infantry role. AP reported that an Army drone initiative backed by Driscoll was being rolled back.
The debate is not simply about whether the Army should use drones. Ukraine, Russia and militaries across the world have demonstrated that inexpensive unmanned systems can perform reconnaissance, strike vehicles, relay communications and force adversaries to spend far more expensive ammunition on defense.
The harder question is how the Army should institutionalize those capabilities. Commanders must decide whether individual units should rapidly build and modify systems themselves, whether procurement should be centralized, how cybersecurity standards should apply and how quickly experimental equipment can become a reliable part of combat formations.
American News Brief has also reported on the administration’s new tariffs of up to 100% on certain imported drones and components. That policy illustrates the industrial side of the same challenge because the Pentagon wants access to inexpensive unmanned systems while Washington is simultaneously trying to reduce dependence on Chinese and other foreign supply chains.
Driscoll leaves as the Army expands into new technology
Driscoll’s departure comes just days after another major Army technology initiative moved forward. The service selected five companies for a program worth up to $2.2 billion to develop nuclear microreactors at military installations, part of an effort to make bases less dependent on vulnerable commercial grids and conventional fuel logistics.
American News Brief detailed the Army’s plan to deploy nuclear microreactors at five installations, an example of the broader modernization agenda that the next secretary will inherit.
Driscoll also gained an unusual diplomatic profile for an Army secretary when Trump brought him into negotiations related to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Reuters described that assignment as a rare diplomatic role for the civilian head of a military service.
The immediate succession plan had not been fully detailed as of early Tuesday. Whoever takes the position will inherit disagreements over drones, acquisition reform, the defense industrial base, force structure and the balance between traditional formations and emerging technology.
Dan Driscoll resigns with the White House publicly praising his performance and with no official explanation accusing him of misconduct or failure. The unresolved question is whether his exit represents an ordinary change in civilian leadership or another sign that competing visions of military transformation are producing damaging instability inside the Pentagon.
That question matters because the Army does not have the luxury of pausing modernization while Washington settles personnel disputes. The service must replenish missile inventories, prepare for high-end conflict, support deployed forces and adapt to technologies changing faster than the military’s traditional acquisition system.
