SEOUL, South Korea — President Donald Trump’s push for a new Trump Kim Jong Un meeting is entering a more difficult phase after the United States and South Korea ended their annual Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise six days early, only for North Korea to answer with a barrage of roughly 10 short-range ballistic missiles. Pyongyang has also signaled that reducing the exercises is not enough by itself to restore the nuclear diplomacy that stalled during Trump’s first presidency.
Trump says he wants to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un later this year and has described their relationship as unusually strong. The administration is presenting renewed personal diplomacy as a potential route to reducing tensions, but North Korea now possesses a substantially larger nuclear arsenal and stronger relationships with China and Russia than it did when Trump and Kim last met.
Trump Kim Jong Un Meeting Bid Follows Major Concession
Trump abruptly ordered the Pentagon to substantially reduce Ulchi Freedom Shield shortly before the exercise began Monday. The command-post portion ended Friday instead of running another six days, while the allies also agreed to cut their planned 14 joint field-training exercises roughly in half.
The administration can argue that military exercises are reversible and therefore useful negotiating leverage. If suspending or reducing some drills produces direct talks capable of lowering the nuclear threat, Washington has sacrificed something temporary rather than surrendering a permanent strategic asset.
The harder question is what the United States received in exchange. North Korea launched about 10 short-range ballistic missiles toward the sea after the reduction was announced, apparently following through on an earlier threat to respond to exercises it considers preparation for invasion.
That sequence creates an awkward optics problem for Washington. Trump reduced allied military activity before Pyongyang made a comparable concession, and North Korea’s immediate response was additional weapons testing rather than an announcement of renewed negotiations.
Kim Jong Un Has More Leverage Than During Trump’s First Term
Trump met Kim three times between 2018 and 2019, including at the inter-Korean Demilitarized Zone. Those encounters produced extraordinary imagery and temporarily lowered rhetorical tensions, but they did not generate a durable agreement dismantling North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
Pyongyang is now negotiating from a stronger strategic position. South Korea’s defense minister estimates North Korea may possess between 80 and 120 nuclear warheads, far above the arsenal available when Trump began his first round of personal diplomacy.
North Korea has also strengthened ties with Moscow and Beijing, reducing its dependence on sanctions relief from Washington. That does not make diplomacy useless, but it means the price North Korea demands for meaningful negotiations could be considerably higher than it was eight years ago.
Pyongyang Says Reduced Exercises Change Little
North Korea has consistently described U.S.-South Korean exercises as hostile acts regardless of whether they are labeled defensive. Pyongyang’s response to the latest reduction indicates that Trump should not assume symbolic restraint will automatically change that position.
Kim’s influential sister, Kim Yo Jong, has also offered a cool response to Trump’s outreach. She said the reduced exercises remained provocative while describing the personal relationship between Trump and Kim as excellent, suggesting Pyongyang is separating personal diplomacy from its strategic demands.
The State Department says the United States remains willing to talk without preconditions. Trump could potentially meet Kim during an Asia trip later this year, with the APEC summit in Shenzhen providing one possible opportunity if Pyongyang becomes receptive.
The uncertainty gives North Korea considerable leverage. Kim can wait while Washington publicly advertises its desire for a meeting, potentially increasing the concessions Pyongyang expects before agreeing to one.
South Korea Must Still Be Able to Defend Itself
Approximately 28,500 U.S. troops remain stationed in South Korea, and combined training is intended to ensure American and South Korean forces can operate together during a crisis. Large-scale exercises are expensive and can be modified, but interoperability cannot simply be recreated after a war starts.
A limited-government foreign policy should ask allied countries to carry a substantial share of their own defense burden. South Korea is wealthy, technologically advanced and capable of spending more on its own security, making Trump’s burden-sharing pressure a legitimate subject for negotiation.
That argument is different from reducing readiness merely to improve the atmosphere for a summit. Washington should distinguish between forcing Seoul to shoulder more responsibility and weakening the combined force before North Korea has made reciprocal security concessions.
Diplomacy Should Be Judged by Results
Trump’s willingness to speak directly with adversaries can be an advantage when traditional diplomatic channels become trapped in ritual and bureaucracy. A presidential meeting can sometimes break a stalemate, particularly when both sides have clear negotiating authority.
The test is not whether a summit happens. It is whether the United States obtains measurable progress on nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, inspections or regional military risk.
Reducing an exercise to unlock a serious negotiation could prove worthwhile. Repeatedly offering concessions simply to persuade Kim Jong Un to appear in photographs would be a different policy entirely.
The Trump Kim Jong Un meeting push therefore deserves a results-based standard. North Korea’s missile barrage has already demonstrated that goodwill alone is not deterrence, and Washington should require meaningful reciprocity before making additional reductions to the military posture protecting American forces and a treaty ally.
